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ON QUASI-STATIONARY MEAN FIELD GAMES MODELS
CHARAFEDDINE MOUZOUNI
ABSTRACT. We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with my-
opic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future
cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the players
observe the evolution of the system and adapt to their new environment without antici-
pating. With a specific cost structures, these models give rise to coupled systems of par-
tial differential equations of quasi-stationary nature. We provide sufficient conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of classical solutions for these systems, and give a rigorous
derivation of these systems from N -players stochastic differential games models. Finally,
we show that the population can self-organize and converge exponentially fast to the er-
godic Mean Field Games equilibrium, if the initial distribution is sufficiently close to it
and the Hamiltonian is quadratic.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Mean Field Games formalism has been introduced some years ago by series of
seminal papers by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions [24–26] and M. Huang, R. Malhame´ and
P. Caines [5, 6]. It describes the evolution of stochastic differential games with a large
population of rational players and where the strategies of the agents are not only affected
by their own preferences but also by the state of the other players through a global mean
field effect. In terms of partial differential equations, these models are typically a system
of a transport or Fokker-Plank equation for the distribution of the agents coupled with a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
The motivation of this paper is to study a strategy-choice mechanism that is different
from classical Mean Field Games. Our agents are myopic, and choose their actions ac-
cording to the information available at time t, by fixing the future state of their opponents
and trying to get the best possible gain in the future ps ą tq. Players anticipate no evo-
lution of the system, undergo changes in their environment and adapt their strategies.
A system of interacting agents can have such irrational behavior in panic situations for
instance. In this framework, agents build a strategy at each moment and the global (in
time) strategy is the history of all the chosen strategies. This decision-making mechanism
intrinsically implies the existence of two time scales: a fast time scale which is linked to
the optimization of the expected future cost; and a slow time scale linked to the actual
evolution of the system. The coexistence of these two time scales gives rise to equations
of quasi-stationary nature. We are also interested in the formation of equilibria for this
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type of evolution systems, and in the rate at which these systems converge towards these
equilibria.
In general the decision-making mechanism in mean field games (MFG for short) in-
volves solving a stochastic control problem, that provides a global in time optimal strat-
egy. In the case where the players aim to minimize a long time average cost, it is well
known that the MFG system of partial differential equations is stationary and takes the
following form [4, 18, 24, 25],
(1.1)
$’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’%
´ σ∆u¯`Hpx,Du¯q ` λ¯ “ F px, m¯q in Q :“ Td
´ σ∆m¯´ divpm¯Hppx,Du¯qq “ 0 in Q
m¯ ě 0, ă m¯ ą:“
ż
Q
m¯ “ 1, ă u¯ ą“ 0
Here σ ą 0, all the functions are Zd-periodic, the unknowns are the constant λ¯ and the
functions u¯ and m¯, Td is the d-dimensional torus, H is the Hamiltonian and F the cou-
pling, both related to the structure of the cost, and Hp is the partial derivative of H with
respect to the second variable. The solution of the first equation in (1.1) can be interpreted
as the equilibrium value function of a “small” player whose cost depends on the density
m¯ of the other players, while the second equation characterizes the distribution of play-
ers at the equilibrium. It is well known (see e.g. [4, 24, 25]) that there exists a solution
pλ¯, u¯, m¯q in R ˆ C2pQq ˆW 1,ppQq for all 1 ď p ă 8 to (1.1), under a wide range of suffi-
cient conditions. Moreover, uniqueness holds under the following monotonicity condition
on F :
(1.2) @m,m1 P PpQq,
ż
Q
`
F px,mq ´ F px,m1q˘ dpm´m1qpxq ě 0.
The interpretation of the above monotonicity condition is that the players dislike con-
gested regions and prefer configurations in which they are scattered.
Another well known example of stationary MFG systems, is the case where players
aim to minimize a discounted infinite-horizon cost functional. In that case, the MFG
system takes the following form (see e.g. [4], among others):
(1.3)
$’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’%
´ σ∆v¯ `Hpx,Dv¯q ` ρv¯ “ F px, µ¯q in Q
´ σ∆µ¯´ divpµ¯Hppx,Dv¯qq “ 0 in Q
µ¯ ě 0, ă µ¯ ą“ 1
where ρ ą 0. It is also well known (see [2–4]) that, under several technical conditions
on H and F , there exists a solution pv¯, µ¯q P C2pQq ˆW 1,ppQq for all 1 ď p ă 8 to (1.3).
Moreover, if H has a linear growth, i.e.
|Hpx, pq| ď Cp1` |p|q
ON QUASI-STATIONARY MEAN FIELD GAMES MODELS 3
for some constant C ą 0, system (1.1) is obtained as a limit of system (1.3) when ρ Ñ 0.
More precisely, we have that
(1.4) p ρ ă v¯ ą, v¯´ ă v¯ ą, µ¯q ÝÑ pλ¯, u¯, m¯q in Rˆ C2pQq ˆ L8pQq as ρÑ 0.
In this paper, we consider a situation where the evolution of the players is driven
by a system of stochastic differential equations, and where choosing a strategy amounts
to choosing a drift vector field that has a suitable regularity; at any time t ě 0, each
player seeks to minimize a cost functional which depends on the current state of the
system, and on the possible future evolution ps ą tq of the player, which is related to
her/his choice of a vector field αtp.q at time t. Thus, choosing the optimal αtp.q amounts
to plan optimally the future evolution of the player, assuming no evolution in her/his
environment. Players follow their planned evolution and adjust their drift αtp.q according
to the observed changes. Further details and explanations about the model will be given
in Section 3.
For the choice of αtp.q we consider two different cost structures: a discounted cost
functional; and a long-time average cost (see Section 3). As we already pointed out, the
scheduling gives rise to two time scales: a slow time scale “t” linked to the evolution of
the state of the system; and a fast scale “s” (which does not appear explicitly in the MFG
systems) related to the scheduling. Under some assumptions on H and F , we show in
Section 3 that at the mean field limit one gets systems of equations of the following form:
(1.5)
$’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’%
´ σ1∆v `Hpx,Dvq ` ρv “ F px, µptqq in p0, T q ˆQ
Btµ´ σ∆µ´ divpµHppx,Dvqq “ 0 in p0, T q ˆQ
µp0q “ m0 ě 0 in Q, ă m0 ą“ 1;
and
(1.6)
$’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’%
´ σ1∆u`Hpx,Duq ` λptq “ F px,mptqq in p0, T q ˆQ
Btm´ σ∆m´ divpmHppx,Duqq “ 0 in p0, T q ˆQ
mp0q “ m0 ě 0 in Q, ă m0 ą“ 1, ă u ą“ 0 in p0, T q,
where ρ ą 0 is fixed throughout this paper, σ1, T ą 0, m0 is the initial density of players,
and all functions are Zd-periodic. Note that pλ, uq (resp. v) depends on time only through
m (resp. µ). The parameters σ1 and σ are respectively: the noise level related to the pre-
diction process (the assessment of the future evolution), and the noise level associated to
the evolution of the players. System (1.6) corresponds to the case of a long time average
cost functional, while system (1.5) corresponds to the case of a discounted cost functional.
We shall see that for any time t, pλptq, uptqq (resp. vptq) characterizes a local Nash equilib-
rium related to a long time average cost (resp. a discounted cost). The first equations in
(1.6) and (1.5) give the “evolution” of the game value of a “small” player, and expresse
the adaptation of players choices to the environment evolution. The evolution of µ and
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m expresses the actual evolution of the population density. We refer to Section 3 for more
detailed explanations.
In contrast to most MFG systems, the uniqueness of solutions to systems (1.6) and
(1.5) does not require the monotonicity condition (1.2) nor the convexity of H with re-
spect to the second variable. This fact is essentially related to the forward-forward struc-
ture of the systems. We also show that the small-discount approximation (1.4) holds for
quasi-stationary models under the same conditions as for the stationary ones. Under the
monotonicity condition (1.2), we prove in Section 4 that for a quadratic Hamiltonian, a
solution pλ, u,mq to (1.6) converges exponentially fast in some sense to the unique equi-
librium pλ¯, u¯, m¯q of (1.1) as tÑ `8, provided thatm0´m¯ is sufficiently small and σ “ σ1.
An analogous result holds also for systems (1.3)-(1.5) when the discount rate ρ is small
enough. This asymptotic behavior is interpreted by the emergence of a self-organizing phe-
nomenon and a phase transition in the system. Note that this entails in particular that our
systems can exhibit a large scale structure even if the cohesion between the agents is only
maintained by interactions between neighbors. The techniques used to prove this asymp-
totic results rely on some algebraic properties pointed out in [10] specific to the quadratic
Hamiltonian. On the other hand, one can not use the usual duality arguments to show
convergence for general data. Therefore the convergence remains an open problem for
more general cases.
Similar asymptotic results were established for the MFG system in [10, 11] for local
and non local coupling. Long time convergence of forward-forward MFG models is also
discussed in [1, 20]. Self-organizing and phase transition in Mean Field Games were ad-
dressed in [29–31], for applications in neuroscience, biology, economics, and engineering.
For an overview on collective motions and self-organization phenomena in mean field
models, we refer to [17] and the references therein. The derivation of the Mean Field
Games system was addressed in [18, 24, 25] for the ergodic case (long time average cost).
More general cases were analyzed in the important recent paper [8] on the master equa-
tion and its application to the convergence problem in Mean Field Games. The reader
will notice in Section 3 that the analysis of the mean-field limit in our case is very similar
to that of the McKean-Vlasov equation. Therefore the proof of convergence is less techni-
cal than in [8] and is based on the usual coupling arguments (see e.g. [28, 32, 35], among
others). MFG models with myopic players are briefly addressed in [1] for applications to
urban settlements and residential choice. However, the sense given to “myopic players”
is different from the one we are considering in this paper: indeed, “myopic players” in [1]
corresponds to individuals which compute their cost functional taking only into account
their very close neighbors, while in this paper ”myopic players” refers to individuals
which anticipate nothing and only undergo the evolution of their environement. In [12],
the authors introduce a model for the study of crowds dynamics, that is very similar to
the one addressed in this paper: in Section 2.2.2, the authors consider a situation where
at any time pedestrians build the optimal path to destination, based on the observed
state of the system. Although the approaches are different, the two models have many
similarities.
Local Nash equilibria for mean field systems of rational agents were also considered in
[14–16]. The authors use the “Best Reply Strategy approach” to derive a kinetic equation
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and provide applications to the evolution of wealth distribution in a conservative [15]
and non-conservative [16] economy. The link between Mean Field Games and the “Best
Reply Strategy approach” is analyzed in [13].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give sufficient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of classical solutions for systems (1.5) and (1.6). The proofs
rely on continuous dependence estimates for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations [27],
the small-discount approximation, and the non-local coupling which provides compact-
ness and regularity. Section 3 is devoted to a detailed derivation of systems (1.5) and (1.6)
from N -players stochastic differential games models. In Section 4, we prove the expo-
nential convergence result for system (1.6). Finally, the Appendix recall some elementary
facts on the Fokker-planck equation.
Notations and assumptions. For simplicity, we work in a periodic setting in order to
avoid issues related to boundary conditions or conditions at infinity. Therefore we will
often consider functions as defined on Q :“ Td (the d-dimensional torus). Throughout
the paper, d ě 1, and the usual inner product on Rd is denoted by x.y or ă x, y ą. We
use the notation ă f ą:“ ş
Q
f and denote PpQq the set of probability measures on Q.
Recall that PpQq becomes a compact topological space when endowed with the weak˚-
convergence thanks to Prokhorov’s theorem. Moreover, this topology is metrizable, e.g.
by the Kantorowich-Rubinstein distance:
d1pπ, π1q :“ sup
"ż
Q
fpxqdpπ ´ π1qpxq, where f : QÑ R is 1-Lipschitz continuous
*
.
We denote by CpQq the set of Zd-periodic continuous functions on Rd, by Cm`ℓpQq,
m P N, ℓ P p0, 1s, the set of Zd-periodic functions havingm-th order derivatives which are
ℓ-Ho¨lder continuous, by pLppQq, }.}pq, 1 ď p ď 8, the set of p-summable Lebesgue mea-
surable and Zd-periodic functions onQ, byW k,ppQq, k P N, 1 ď p ď 8, the Sobolev space
of Zd-periodic functions having a weak derivatives up to order k which are p-summable
on Q, and for a given Lipschitz continuous function f , we define
}f}Lip :“ sup
x‰y
|fpxq ´ fpyq|
|x´ y| .
For γ P p0, 1q, we use the notation C1`γ{2,2`γ for parabolic Ho¨lder spaces, with the norm
}.}C1`γ{2,2`γ , as defined in [23]. For a given T ą 0, we note
QT :“ p0, T q ˆQ, and QT :“ r0, T s ˆQ,
and C1`γ{2,2`γpQT q the space of Zd-periodic function in C1`γ{2,2`γpr0, T s ˆ Rdq.
Throughout the proofs, we denote by C a generic constant, and we use the notation
Cη,β to point out the dependence of the constant on parameters η, β. For any vector
pyjq1ďjďN we use the notation y´i “ pyjqj‰i. For a random variable X defined on some
probability space, LpXq denotes the law of X. Throughout the paper, γ P p0, 1q is a fixed
parameter.
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2. ANALYSIS OF THE QUASI-STATIONARY SYSTEMS
This section is devoted to the analysis of systems (1.5) and (1.6). A detailed derivation
of these systems from a N -person differential game will be given in Section 3.
We shall use the following conditions:
(H1) the operator m Ñ F p.,mq is defined from PpQq into LippQq :“ C0`1pQq, and
satisfies
(2.1) sup
mPPpQq
}F p.,mq}Lip ă 8;
(H2) theHamiltonianH : QˆRd ÝÑ R is locally Lipschitz continuous, and Zd-periodic
with respect to the first variable;
(H3) Hp exists and is locally Lipschitz continuous;
(H4) DxHp andHpp exist and are locally Lipschitz continuous;
(H5) there exists a constant κF ą 0 such that, for anym,m1 P PpQq,
}F p.,mq ´ F p.,m1q}8 ď κF d1pm,m1q;
(H6) m0 is a probability measure, absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, and its densitym0 belongs to C
2`γpQq.
The Hamiltonian H satisfies one of the following sets of conditions:
C1. H grows at most linearly in p, i.e., there exists κH ą 0, such that
|Hpx, pq| ď κH p1` |p|q , @x P Q, @p P Rd;
C2. H is superlinear in p uniformly in x, i.e.,
inf
xPQ
|Hpx, pq|{|p| Ñ `8 as |p| Ñ `8,
and there exists θ P p0, 1q, κ ą 0, such that a.e x P Q and |p| large enough,
(2.2) 〈DxH, p〉` θ.H2 ě ´κ|p|2.
Condition (C1.) arises naturally in control theory when the controls are chosen in a
bounded set, whereas under condition (C2.) the control variable of each player can take
any orientation in states space and can be arbitrary large with a large cost. As it is pointed
out in [4, 24, 25], the condition (2.2) is interpreted as a condition on the oscillations of H
and plays no role when d “ 1.
A triplet pλ, u,mq is a classical solution to (1.6), if m : r0, T s ˆ Rd ÝÑ R is continuous,
of class C2 in space, and of class C1 in time, u : p0, T q ˆ Rd ÝÑ R is of class C2 in space,
and pλ, u,mq satisfies (1.6) in the classical sense. Similarly, a couple pv, µq is a classical
solution to (1.5), if µ : r0, T s ˆ Rd ÝÑ R is continuous, of class C2 in space, of class C1 in
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time, v : p0, T q ˆ Rd ÝÑ R is of class C2 in space and pv, µq satisfies (1.5) in the classical
sense.
In this section, we give an existence and uniqueness result of classical solutions for
system (1.5) and (1.6) under condition (C1.). In addition, we show that system (1.6) is
also well-posed under condition (C2.).
We start by dealing with the case where theHamiltonian has a linear growth (condition
(C1.)). Let us consider the quasi-stationary approximate problem (1.5). We start by analyzing
the first equation in (1.5).
Lemma 2.1. Under assumptions (H1), (H2) and (C1.), for any µ P PpQq and ̺ ą 0, the problem
(2.3) ´ σ1∆v `Hpx,Dvq ` ̺v “ F px, µq in Q
has a unique solution v̺rµs P C2`γpQq. In addition, there exists constants κ0 ą 0 and θ P p0, 1s,
such that for any µ P PpQq and ̺ ą 0, the following estimates hold
(2.4a) }̺v̺rµs}8 ď }F }8 ` κH ,
(2.4b) }v̺rµs ´ 〈v̺rµs〉 }C2`θ ď κ0.
Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness for equation (2.3) relies on regularity results
and a priori estimates from elliptic theory. A detailed proof to this result is given in [4,
Theorem 2.6] in a more general framework. By looking at the extrema of vrµs, one easily
gets (2.4a). The second bound is proved by contradiction using the strong maximum
principle. The details of the proof are given in [4, Theorem 2.5]. Condition (2.1) ensures
that the constant κ0 does not depend on µ. 
Remark 2.2. Note that the well-posedness of equation (2.3) still holds under the following
condition on H (the so-called natural growth condition),
Dκ1H ą 0, |Hpx, pq| ď κ1H
´
1` |p|2
¯
, @x P Q,@p P Rd;
which is less restrictive than (C1.).
We now state a continuous dependence estimate due to Marchi [27], which plays a
crucial role.
Lemma 2.3. Assume (H1)-(H3), and (C1.). For any µ, µ1 P PpQq and ̺ ą 0, we have that
(2.5a) }v̺rµs ´ v̺rµ1s}8 ď ̺´1}F p., µq ´ F p., µ1q}8.
Moreover, for any M ą 0, there exists a constant χM ą 0, such that for any ̺ P p0,Mq and
µ, µ1 P PpQq, the following holds
(2.5b) }w̺rµs ´ w̺rµ1s}C2 ď χM}F p., µq ´ F p., µ1q}8,
where w̺ “ v̺ ´ 〈v̺〉.
Proof. Note that
v˘ :“ v̺rµ1s ˘ ̺´1}F p., µq ´ F p., µ1q}8,
are respectively a super- and a sub-solution to equation (2.3) with the coupling term
F p., µq. Thus, estimate (2.5a) follows thanks to the comparison principle.
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The proof of (2.5b) is similar to [27, Theorem 2.2]. Nevertheless we give a proof to this
result because in this particular framework we do not need to fulfill all the conditions
of [27]. We shall proceed by contradiction assuming that there exists sequences p̺nq P
p0,Mq, pµnq, pµ1nq P PpQq, such that for any n ě 0,
(2.6) cn ě n}F p., µnq ´ F p., µ1nq}8,
where cn :“ }w̺nrµns ´ w̺nrµ1ns}C2 , and limn ̺n “ 0. Note that the function
Wn :“ c´1n
`
w̺nrµns ´ w̺nrµ1ns
˘
satisfies the following equation
Rn ´ σ1∆Wn ` fn.DWn “ 0,
where
Rn :“ ̺nWn ` c´1n ̺n
〈
v̺nrµns ´ v̺nrµ1ns
〉` c´1n
`
F p., µnq ´ F p., µ1nq
˘
,
and
fnpxq :“
ż 1
0
Hp
`
x, sDw̺nrµns ` p1´ sqDw̺nrµ1ns
˘
ds.
Using (2.6) and (2.5a), one checks that limn }Rn}8 “ 0. In addition, (H3) and (2.4b) en-
tails that }fn}Lip is uniformly bounded. Moreover, invoking standard regularity theory
for linear elliptic equations (see e.g. [19]), the sequence pWnq is uniformly bounded in
C2`θ1pQq for some θ1 P p0, 1s. We infer that pfn,Wnq converge uniformly to some pf,W q
in CpQq ˆ C2pQqwhich satisfies
´σ1∆W ` f.DW “ 0, }W }C2 “ 1, 〈W 〉 “ 0.
Since W is periodic, we deduce from the strong maximum principle that W must be
constant; this provides the desired contradiction. 
Corollary 2.4. Under (H5) and assumptions of Lemma 2.3, for any ̺ ą 0 there exists a constant
κ̺ ą 0 such that,
(2.7a) }v̺rµs ´ v̺rµ1s}C2 ď κ̺ d1pµ, µ1q
for any µ, µ1 P PpQq.
We shall give now an existence and uniqueness result for system (1.5).
Theorem 2.5. Under conditions (H1)-(H6) and (C1.), there exists a unique classical solution
pv, µq in C1{2 `r0, T s;C2pQq˘ˆ C1,2pQT q to the problem (1.5).
Proof. Existence : For a constant δ ą 0 large enough to be chosen below, let Cδ be the set of
maps µ P Cpr0, T s;PpQqq such that
sup
s‰t
d1pµptq, µpsqq
|t´ s|1{2 ă δ.
Note that Cδ is compact thanks to Ascoli’s Theorem, and the compactness of pPpQq, d1q.
We aim to prove our claim using Schauder’s fixed point theorem (see e.g. [34, p. 25]). Set
for any px, νq P Qˆ PpQq,
Gpx; νq :“ Hppx,Dvρrνspxqq.
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Note that G and DxG are uniformly bounded thanks to (H3), (H4), and the uniform
bound (2.4b). We define an operator
Ψ : Cδ Ñ Cδ,
such that, for a given ν P Cδ, Ψν :“ µ is the solution to the following “McKean-Vlasov”
equation
(2.8) Btµ´ σ∆µ´ divpµGpx; νptqqq “ 0, µp0q “ m0.
Let us check that Ψ is well defined. Note that the above equation can be written as
Btµ´ σ∆µ´ xDµ,Gpx; νptqqy ´ µdiv pGpx; νptqqq “ 0.
Using assumption (H3) and estimate (2.7a), we have for any t ‰ s and x P Q
|Gpx; νptqq ´Gpx; νpsqq| ď Cρ,Hp d1pνptq, νpsqq,
so that
sup
xPQ
sup
t‰s
|Gpx; νptqq ´Gpx; νpsqq|
|t´ s|1{2 ď Cδ,ρ,Hp ă 8.
In the sameway, one checks that functions px, tq Ñ Gpx, νptqq and px, tq Ñ div rGpx, νptqqs
are in Cγ
1{2,γ1pQT q, where γ1 “ minpγ, θq, thanks to Lemma 2.1 and (H4). Here γ and θ are
the Ho¨lder exponents appearing in (H6) and (2.4b) respectively. We infer that problem
(2.8) has a unique solution µ P C1`γ1{2,2`γ1pQT qwhich satisfies
(2.9) }µ}C1`γ1{2,2`γ1 ď C}G}C1 }m0}C2`γ1 ,
owing to existence and uniqueness theory for parabolic equations in Ho¨lder spaces [23,
Theorem IV.5.1 p. 320]. Furthermore, using classical properties of Fokker-Planck equa-
tion (see Lemma A.1), it follows that
d1pµptq, µpsqq ď CT p1` }G}8q |t´ s|1{2.
Therefore µ P Cδ for big enough δ, since }G}8 and CT does not dependent on ν nor on δ.
In particular, the operatorΨ is well defined form Cδ into Cδ XC1`γ1{2,2`γ1pQT q.
Let us check now that Ψ is continuous. Given a sequence νn Ñ ν in Cδ, let
µn :“ Ψνn, and µ :“ Ψν.
Invoking Ascoli’s Theorem, estimate (2.9) and the uniqueness of the solution to (2.8), it
holds that
lim
n
}µn ´ µ}C1,2 “ 0.
The convergence is then easily proved to be in Cpr0, T s,PpQqq. Thus, by Schauder fixed
point theorem the map Ψ : Cδ Ñ Cδ has a fixed point µ P C1,2pQT q and pvρrµs, µq is a clas-
sical solution to (1.5). In addition, estimate (2.7a) entails that vρrµs P C1{2
`r0, T s;C2pQq˘.
Uniqueness : Let pv, µq and pv1, µ1q be two solutions to the system (1.5), w :“ v ´ v1 and
ν :“ µ´ µ1. One checks that# Btν ´ σ∆ν ´ divpνHppx,Dvqq “ div `µ1 `Hppx,Dvq ´Hppx,Dv1q˘˘ ,
νt“0 “ 0.
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By standard duality techniques, we deduce that
1
2
d
dt
}νptq}22`σ}Dνptq}22 “ ´
ˆż
Q
νDν.Hppx,Dvq `
ż
Q
µ1Dν.
`
Hppx,Dvq ´Hppx,Dv1q
˘˙
,
so that
(2.10)
1
2
d
dt
}νptq}22 `
σ
2
}Dνptq}22 ď C
ˆ
}G}8}νptq}22 `
ż
Q
|µ1Dw|2
˙
.
From (2.7a) and (2.9), we infer thatż
Q
|µ1Dw|2 ď C}m0}2C2`γ d1pµ, µ1q2 ď C}m0}2C2`γ }νptq}22.
Plugging this into (2.10) provides
}νptq}22 ď C
ż t
0
}νpsq}22 ds,
which implies that ν ” 0, and so w ” 0 thanks to (2.7a). The proof is complete. 
Let us now deal with system (1.6). We shall start by proving the well-posedness for the
first equation in (1.6) and by giving a continuous dependence estimate.
Lemma 2.6. Under conditions (H1)-(H3), (H5) and (C1.), for any measure m P PpQq, there
exists a unique solution pλrms, urmsq P Rˆ C2pQq to the problem
(2.11) ´ σ1∆u`Hpx,Duq ` λ “ F px,mq in Q, ă u ą“ 0.
Moreover, for anym,m1 P PpQq, the following estimates hold
(2.12a)
ˇˇ
λrms ´ λrm1sˇˇ ď κF d1pm,m1q,
(2.12b)
››urms ´ urm1s››
C2
ď χ1κF d1pm,m1q.
Proof. It is well known (see e.g. [2,3]) that for a givenm P PpQq, there exists a unique peri-
odic solution pλrms, urmsq in RˆCpQq to (2.11). Regularity of the solution, and estimates
(2.12a), (2.12b) follow from Lemma 2.3, and small-discount approximation techniques
(see e.g. [2–4]). 
Remark 2.7. It is possible to show more regularity for the maps m Ñ λrms, m Ñ urms
under additional regularity assumptions on F and H . For instance, if Hpp ě κeId for
some κe ą 0, and F satisfies
sup
m‰m1
d1pm,m1q´1
›››› δFδmp.,m, .q ´ δFδm p.,m1, .q
››››
C0ˆC1
ă 8,
then ur.s and λr.s are of class C1 in PpQq. We refer to [8] for the definition of derivatives
in PpQq and notations. In addition, we have that
δu
δm
pmqpνq :“ wpm, νq and δλ
δm
pmqpνq :“ ςpm, νq
for any m in PpQq and any signed measure ν on Q, where pς, wq is the solution to the
following problem
´σ1∆w `Hp px,Durmsq .Dw ` ς “ δF
δm
pmqpνq in Q, and 〈w〉 “ 0.
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One has also an analogous result for the map v̺r.s defined in Lemma 2.1. We omit the
details and invoke [8, Proposition 3.8] for a similar approach.
We prove now well-posedness for system (1.6).
Theorem 2.8. Under assumptions (H1)-(H6) and (C1.), there exists a unique classical solution
pλ, u,mq in C1{2 pr0, T sq ˆC1{2 `r0, T s;C2pQq˘ˆC1,2 `QT ˘ to system (1.6). This result holds
if one replaces condition (C1.) by condition (C2.).
Proof. The proof of existence relies on small-discount approximation techniques. We give
here an adaptation of these techniques for the quasi-stationary case. The crucial point in
this proof is estimates (2.4a) and (2.4b).
Assume first that H satisfies condition (C1.). Let pv̺, µ̺q be the unique classical so-
lution to (1.5) replacing ρ by ̺, and set w̺ :“ v̺ ´ 〈v̺〉. Invoking (2.4a) and (2.4b), we
have
(2.13)
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
´ σ1∆w̺ `Hpx,Dw̺q ` ̺w̺ “ F px, µ̺ptqq ´ ̺ ă v̺ ą in QT ,
Btµ̺ ´ σ∆µ̺ ´ div pHppx,Dv̺qµ̺q “ 0 in QT , µ̺p0q “ m0 in Q,
sup
0ďtďT
}w̺ptq}C2`θ ď κ0, sup
0ďtďT
}̺v̺rµptqs}8 ď }F }8 ` κH .
On the other hand, recall that according to [23, Theorem IV.5.1 p. 320] it holds that
(2.14) }µ̺}C1`γ1{2,2`γ1 ď C1}m0}C2`γ1 ,
where γ1 “ minpγ, θq, and the constantC1 ą 0 is independent of ̺ thanks to (2.4b). Hence,
one can extract a subsequence ̺n Ñ 0 such that for any t P r0, T s
(2.15)
p̺n 〈v̺nptq〉 , w̺nptq, µ̺nq Ñ pλptq, uptq,mq in Rˆ C2pQq ˆ C1,2pQT q as nÑ8,
where pλ, u,mq is a classical solution to (1.6). In addition, for any t, s P r0, T s, estimates
(2.12a) and (2.12b) provide
}urmptqs ´ urmpsqs}C2 ď χ1κF d1pmptq,mpsqq,
and
|λrmptqs ´ λrmpsqs| ď κF d1pmptq,mpsqq.
Thus, urms P C1{2 `r0, T s;C2pQq˘ and λrms P C1{2 pr0, T sq. The proof of uniqueness is
identical to Theorem 2.5. Hence, the proof of well-posedness under (C1.) is complete.
If we suppose thatH satisfies only (C2.), by virtue of (2.1) one can derive the following
uniform bound using Bernstein’s method (see [24, 25] and [4, Theorem 2.1]):
(2.16) DκB ą 0, @ν P PpQqN , }Durνs}8 ď κB .
Thus, by a suitable truncation ofH one reduces the problem to the previous case. 
Remark 2.9. All the results of this section hold true if one replaces the elliptic parts of the
equations with a more general operator L of the following form:
L :“ ´Tr `ψpxqD2˘ ,
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where ψ is Zd-periodic, }ψ}Lip ă 8, and there exists κψ ą 0 such that ψpxq ě κψId.
3. MODELS EXPLANATION & MEAN FIELD LIMIT
We provide in this section a rigorous interpretation for the quasi-stationary systems
(1.5) and (1.6) in terms of N -players stochastic differential games. We shall start by writ-
ing systems of equations for N players, then we pass to the limit when the number of
players goes to infinity assuming that all the players are identical. Throughout this sec-
tion, we employ the notations introduced in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.6.
3.1. Stochastic differential games models for N -players. We consider a game of N -
players where at each time agents choose their strategy
- assuming no evolution in their environment;
- according to an evaluation of their future situation emanating from the choice.
Observing the evolution of the system, players adjust their strategies without anticipat-
ing. More precisely, each player observe the state of the system at time t and chooses
the best drift vector field αtp.q which optimize her/his future evolution ps ą tq. The
player adapts and corrects her/his choice as the system evolves. This situation amounts
to resolving at each moment an optimization problem which consists in finding the vec-
tor field (strategy) which guarantees the best future cost. Our agents are myopic: they
anticipate no evolution and only undergo changes in their environment.
Let us now give a mathematical formalism to our model. Let pW jq1ďjďN be a family
of N independent Brownian motions in Rd over some probability space pΩ,F ,Pq, and
pDiq1ďiďN be closed subsets of Rd. We suppose that the probability space pΩ,F ,Pq is
rich enough to fulfill the assumptions that will be formulated in this section. Let V :“
pV 1, ..., V N q be a vector of i.i.d random variables with values in Rd that are independent
of pW jq1ďjďN and let
Ft :“ σ
 
V j ,W ju , 1 ď j ď N, u ď t
(
be the information available to the players at time t. We suppose that Ft contains the
P-negligible sets of F .
Consider a system driven by the following stochastic differential equations
(3.1) dXit “ αitpXitqdt`
?
2σi dW
i
t , X
i
0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N.
For any t ě 0, the i-th player choses αit in the set of admissible strategies denoted by Ai,
that is, the set of Zd-periodic processes αi defined on Ω, indexed by Rd with values inDi,
such that
(3.2) sup
ωPΩ
}αipω, .q}Lip ă 8.
The reason of considering condition (3.2) will be clear in (3.4) below. At each time t ě 0,
player i faces an optimization problem for choosing αitp.q P Ai which insures the best
future cost. We will explain the optimization problem in Section 3.1.1.
These instant choices give rise to a global (in time) strategies pα1t , ..., αNt qtě0 which does
not necessarily guarantee the well-posedness of equations (3.1) in a suitable sense. Hence
we need to introduce the following definitions:
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Definition 3.1. Let T ą 0 and i “ 1, ..., N . We say that the i-th equation of (3.1) is well-
posed on r0, T s, if there exists a processXi, unique a.s, with continuous sample paths on
r0, T s which satisfies the following properties:
(i) pXiqtPr0,T s is pFtqtPr0,T s-adapted;
(ii) P
“
Xi0 “ V i
‰ “ 1;
(iii) P
”şt
0
ˇˇ
αispXisq
ˇˇ
ds ă 8
ı
“ 1 @t P r0, T s;
(iv) for any t P r0, T s, the following holds
Xit “ V i `
ż t
0
αispXisqds`
?
2σiW
i
t a.s .
System (3.1) is well-posed if all equations are.
Definition 3.2. Let T ą 0 and i “ 1, ..., N . We say that the global strategy pαitqtě0 is
feasible on r0, T s, if the i-th equation of (3.1) is well-posed on r0, T s.
Note that in contrast to standard optimal control situations, the optimal global strategy
is not a solution to a global (in time) optimization problem, but it is the history of all the
choices made during the game. The agents plan and correct their plans as the game
evolves, and the global strategy is achieved through this process of planning and self-
correction.
3.1.1. The case of a long time average cost. Consider the case where the i-th player seeks to
minimize the following long time average cost:
(3.3) J i
`
t, V, α1t , ..., α
N
t
˘
:“ lim inf
τÑ`8
1
τ
E
„ż τ
t
LipX is,t, αitpX is,tqq ` F ipX is,t;X´it qds
ˇˇˇ
Ft

,
where Li : Rd ˆ Di Ñ R and F i : Rd ˆ RdpN´1q Ñ R are continuous and Zd- periodic
with respect to the first variable. At any time t ě 0, the process pX is,tqsąt represents the
possible future trajectory of player i, related to the chosen strategy (vector field) αit P Ai.
In other words, pX is,tqsąt is what is likely to happen (in the future s ą t) if player i plays
αit at the instant t. Mathematically, we consider that pX is,tqsąt are driven by the following
(fictitious) stochastic differential equations
(3.4)
$&
% dX
i
s,t “ αitpX is,tqds`
b
2σ1i dB
i
s´t,t s ą t,
X it,t “ Xit , i “ 1, ..., N,
where tpBi.,tq1ďiďNutě0 is a family of standard Brownian motions, and for any t ě 0, the
process pBis´t,tqsąt represents the noise related to the future prediction (or guess) of the
i-th player. For simplicity, we assume that for any i P t1, ..., Nu, t ě 0, and s ą t,
(3.5) Bis´t,t is independent from Ft.
Note that system (3.4) is well-posed in the strong sense, and that the definition of pX is,tqsąt
introduces a fast (instantaneous) scale ‘s’ related to the projection in future, which is
different from the real (slow) scale ‘t’.
The cost functional (3.3) is an evaluation of the future cost of player i, given the in-
formation available at time t. In this model we consider that the evaluation horizon is
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infinite. The cost structure expresses the fact that agents are myopic: they anticipate no
future change and act as if the system will remain immutable. As they adjust, they un-
dergo changes and do not anticipate them.
We now give a definition of Nash equilibrium for our game.
Definition 3.3. We say that a vector of global strategies pαˆ1t , ..., αˆNt qtě0 is a Nash equilib-
rium of the N -person game on r0, T s, for the initial position V “ pV1, ..., VN q, if for any
i “ 1, ..., N ,
pαˆitqtě0 is feasible on r0, T s,
and
αˆit “ arg max
αiPAi
J i
`
t, V, αˆ1t , ..., αˆ
i´1
t , α
i, αˆi`1t , ..., αˆ
N
t
˘
a.s @t P r0, T s.
In other words, a Nash equilibrium on r0, T s is the history of local Nash equilibria, which
is feasible on [0,T].
Next we provide a verification result that produces a Nash equilibrium for the N -
person game associated to the cost (3.3). Let us introduce the following notation for
empirical measures:
νˆMY :“
1
M
Mÿ
i“1
δYi , @Y “ pYiq P RMd.
For any i “ 1, ..., N , we suppose that F i depends only on x P Q and on the empirical
density of the other variables. Namely, for any x P Q and Y “ pY 1, ..., Y N´1q P RdpN´1q,
F i px;Y q :“ F i
´
x; νˆN´1Y
¯
.
Set for px, pq P QˆRd,
H ipx, pq :“ sup
αPDi
 ´p.α´ Lipx, αq( .
Throughout this section, we assume that assumptions of Theorem 2.8 hold for H i and
F i, and that the supremum is achieved at a unique point α¯i in the definition ofH i, for all
px, pq, so that
(3.6) H ippx, pq “ ´α¯ipx, pq :“ argmax
αPDi
 ´p.α´ Lipx, αq( .
We also employ the notations introduced in Lemma 2.6: namely, for any π P PpQq, we
denote by pλirπs, uirπsq the unique solution to
´ σ1i∆ui `H ipx,Duiq ` λi “ F ipx, πq in Q, ă u ą“ 0.
Remark 3.4. It is possible to consider a more general form for the drift in system (3.4). For
instance, one can replace α by the following (more general) affine form:
f ipx, αq :“ gipxq `Gipxqα,
where Gi P LippQqdˆd and gi P LippQqd. Then
H ipx, pq “ ´p.gi ` sup
αPDi
 ´p.Gipxqα´ Lipx, αq( .
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If Li is Lipschitz in x, uniformly as α varies in any bounded subset, and asymptotically
super-linear, i.e.
lim
|α|Ñ`8
inf
xPQ
Lipx, αq{|α| “ `8,
then the supremum in the definition of H i is attained. Uniqueness of the supremum
holds if Li is strictly convex with respect to the second variable.
The following result characterizes a Nash equilibrium on r0, T s associated to the cost
functional (3.3).
Proposition 3.5.
(1) The following system of equations is well-posed on r0, T s,
(3.7) dX¯it “ α¯i
´
X¯it ,Du
i
”
νˆN´1
X¯´it
ı
pX¯itq
¯
dt`?2σi dW it , X¯i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N.
(2) Let for x P Q and t P r0, T s
α¯itpxq :“ α¯i
´
x,Dui
”
νˆN´1
X¯´it
ı
pxq
¯
, i “ 1, ..., N.
The vector pα¯1t , ..., α¯Nt qtě0 defines a Nash equilibrium on r0, T s for any initial data.
(3) The following holds
λi
”
νˆN´1
X¯´it
ı
“ lim inf
τÑ`8
1
τ
E
„ż τ
t
LipX¯ is,t, α¯itpX¯ is,tqq ` F i
´
X¯ is,t, νˆ
N´1
X¯´it
¯
ds
ˇˇˇ
Ft

,
where pX¯ is,tqsąt are obtained by solving$&
% dX¯
i
s,t “ α¯itpX¯ is,tqds`
b
2σ1i dB
i
s´t,t, s ą t,
X¯ it,t “ X¯it , i “ 1, ..., N.
Proof. Assertion (1) is a consequence of the regularity results of Lemma 2.6, while asser-
tions (2) and (3) follows by standard verification arguments (see e.g. [4, Theorem 3.4],
among many others). For any τ ą t ě 0 and i P t1, .., Nu one has
uipX¯ iτ,tq “ uipX¯ it,tq `
ż τ
t
DuipX¯ is,tq.α¯itpX¯ is,tqds`
ż τ
t
σ1i∆u
ipX¯ is,tqds
`
b
2σ1i
ż τ
t
DuipX¯ is,tqdBis´t,t,
where here ui ” ui
”
νˆN´1
X¯´it
ı
in order to simplify the presentation. Owing to (3.6) one gets
uipX¯ iτ,tq “ uipX¯ it,tq `
ż τ
t
`´H ipX¯ is,t,DuipX¯ is,tqq ` σ1i∆uipX¯ is,tq˘ ds
`
b
2σ1i
ż τ
t
DuipX¯ is,tqdBis´t,t ´
ż τ
t
LipX¯ is,t, α¯itpX¯ is,tqqds
“ uipX¯ it,tq ´
ż τ
t
 
LipX¯ is,t, α¯itpX¯ is,tqq ` F ipX¯ is,t; X¯´it q
(
ds
` pτ ´ tqλi `
b
2σ1i
ż τ
t
DuipX¯ is,tqdBis´t,t.
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Hence, from (3.5) we infer that
τ´1E
“
uipX iτ,tq | Ft
‰ “ p1´ tτ´1qλi ` τ´1E “uipX it,tq | Ft‰
´ τ´1E
„ż τ
t
LipX¯ is,t, α¯itpX¯ is,tqq ` F i
´
X¯ is,t, νˆ
N´1
X¯´it
¯
ds
ˇˇˇ
Ft

.
Note that estimate (2.12b) provides a uniforme bound on ui r.s. Thus, by taking the limit
in the last expression one gets
λi
”
νˆN´1
X¯´it
ı
“ lim inf
τÑ`8
1
τ
E
„ż τ
t
LipX¯ is,t, α¯itpX¯ is,tqq ` F i
´
X¯ is,t, νˆ
N´1
X¯´it
¯
ds
ˇˇˇ
Ft

.
On the other hand, one easily checks that pα¯1t , ..., α¯Nt qtě0 is a Nash equilibrium for any
initial data V “ pV 1, ..., V N q owing to (3.6). 
Remark 3.6. Note that the problem structure decouples the “fictitious” dynamics (3.4),
and allows to compute the controls.
3.1.2. The case of a discounted cost functional. Set ρ1, ..., ρN ą 0. We consider now the case
where the i-th player seeks to minimize the following discounted cost functional:
(3.8) J iρi
`
t, V, α¯1t , ..., α¯
N
t
˘
:“ E
„ż 8
t
e´ρ
isLipX is,t, αitpX is,tqq ` F i
´
X is,t; νˆ
N´1
X´it
¯
ds
ˇˇˇ
Ft

,
where all the functions are defined in the same way as in the previous case, with anal-
ogous notations and assumptions. One checks that a similar result to Proposition 3.5
holds, i.e. that the following problem:
(3.9) dZ¯it “ α¯i
´
Z¯it ,Dv
i
ρ
”
νˆN´1
Z¯´it
ı `
Z¯it
˘¯
dt`?2σi dW it , Z¯i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N,
characterizes a Nash equilibrium on r0, T s associated to the cost functional (3.8).
3.2. Themean field limitN Ñ `8. We address now the convergence problemwhen the
number of players goes to infinity, assuming that all the players are indistinguishable.
Assume that: Di “ D; ρi “ ρ; σi “ σ; σ1i “ σ1; F i “ F ; H i “ H ; and α¯i “ α¯ so that
Li “ H˚ for all 1 ď i ď N , where H˚ is the Legendre transform of H with respect to the p
variable. We suppose also that
LpV iq “ m0 P C2`γpQq for any i “ 1, ..., N.
For simplicity we shall use the notations Xt :“
`
X1t , ...,X
N
t
˘
and Zt :“
`
Z1t , ..., Z
N
t
˘
instead of X¯t :“
`
X¯1t , ..., X¯
N
t
˘
and Z¯t :“
`
Z¯1t , ..., Z¯
N
t
˘
. Under the above assumptions,
systems (3.7) and (3.9) are rewritten respectively on the following form:
(3.10)
$’’’&
’’’%
dXit “ ´Hp
´
Xit ,Du
”
νˆN´1
X´it
ı
pXitq
¯
dt`
?
2σ dW it , 0 ď t ď T,
X¯i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N ;
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and
(3.11)
$’’’&
’’’%
dZit “ ´Hp
´
Zit ,Dvρ
”
νˆN´1
Z´it
ı
pZitq
¯
dt`
?
2σ dW it , 0 ď t ď T,
Z¯i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N.
Our main result in this section says that at the mean field limit N Ñ 8, one recovers
the quasi-stationary systems (1.6) and (1.5), which respectively correspond to (3.10) and
(3.11). Note that systems (1.6) and (1.5) can be rewritten on the form of Mckean Vlasov
equations:
(1.6)
$’&
’%
Btm´ σ∆m´ div pmHp px,Durmptqsqq “ 0 in QT ,
mp0q “ m0 in Q,
and
(1.5)
$’&
’%
Btµ´ σ∆µ´ div pµHp px,Dvρrµptqsqq “ 0 in QT ,
µp0q “ m0 in Q.
Thus, one can use the usual coupling arguments (see e.g. [28, 32, 35]) to deduce the con-
vergence. The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.7. For any t P r0, T s, it holds that:
lim
N
max
1ďiďN
d1
`
L
`
Xit
˘
,mptq˘ “ 0;
lim
N
max
1ďiďN
d1
`
L
`
Zit
˘
, µptq˘ “ 0;
lim
N
››urmptqs ´ Eu “νˆNXt‰››8 “ 0;
lim
N
ˇˇ
λrmptqs ´ Eλ “νˆNXt‰ˇˇ “ 0; and
lim
N
››vρrµptqs ´ Evρ “νˆNZt‰››8 “ 0.
The analysis of the limit transitionN Ñ `8 is essentially based on continuous depen-
dence estimates, and therefore the mean field analysis is identical for both systems. Thus,
we shall give the details only for system (3.10).
Let us introduce the following artificial systems:
(3.12)
$’’&
’’%
dY i “ ´Hp
`
Y it ,Du rmptqs pY it q
˘
dt`
?
2σ dW it , 0 ď t ď T,
Y¯ i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N ;
and
(3.13)
$’’&
’’%
dX˜i “ ´Hp
´
X˜it ,Du
“
νˆNXt
‰ pX˜itq¯ dt`?2σ dW it , 0 ď t ď T,
X˜i0 “ V i, i “ 1, ..., N.
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Observe that systems (3.12)-(3.13) are well-posed, and that the uniqueness of the solution
to (1.6) provides that
L
`
Y 1t , ..., Y
N
t
˘ “ bNi“1mptq.
On the other hand, note that
(3.14) L
´
X˜
ξp1q
t , ..., X˜
ξpNq
t
¯
“ L
´
X˜1t , ..., X˜
N
t
¯
is fulfilled for any permutation ξ, and any t P r0, T s. In addition, one checks that
(3.15) max
1ďiďN
sup
0ďtďT
E
ˇˇˇ
Xit ´ X˜it
ˇˇˇ
ď CT
N ´ 1
holds thanks to the continuous dependence estimate (2.12b), since
sup
0ďtďT
max
1ďiďN
d1
´
νˆNXt , νˆ
N´1
X´it
¯
ď C
N ´ 1 .
Next we compare the trajectories of (3.12) and (3.13), and show that they are increas-
ingly close on r0, T s when N Ñ `8.
Proposition 3.8. Under assumptions of this section, it holds that
max
1ďiďN
sup
0ďtďT
E
ˇˇˇ
X˜it ´ Y it
ˇˇˇ
ď CTN´1{pd`8q.
Proof. For any i P t1, ..., Nu and t P r0, T s, one has
d
dt
”
X˜it ´ Y it
ı
“ Hp
`
Y it ,DurmptqspY it q
˘ ´Hp ´X˜it ,Du “νˆNXt‰ pX˜itq¯
“ T1ptq ` T2ptq ` T3ptq ` T4ptq,
where
T1ptq :“ HppY it ,DurmptqspY it qq ´HppY it ,Du
“
νˆNYt
‰ pY it qq,
T2ptq :“ HppY it ,Du
“
νˆNYt
‰ pY it qq ´HppY it ,Du “νˆNXt‰ pY it qq,
T3ptq :“ HppY it ,Du
“
νˆNXt
‰ pY it qq ´HppX˜it ,Du “νˆNXt‰ pY it qq,
and
T4ptq :“ HppX˜it ,Du
“
νˆNXt
‰ pY it qq ´HppX˜it ,Du “νˆNXt‰ pX˜itqq.
Using the continuous dependence estimate (2.12b) one gets
|T2ptq| ď C
N
Nÿ
j“1
|X˜jt ´ Y jt |, and |T1ptq| ď C d1pmptq, µˆNYtq.
On the other hand, the following holds
|T3ptq ` T4ptq| ď C|X˜it ´ Y it |.
The key step is the estimation the non-local term Ed1pm, µˆNY q; we use the following
estimate due to Horowitz and Karandikar (see [33, Theorem 10.2.7]):
Ed1pmptq, µˆNYtq ď κdN´1{pd`8q @t P r0, T s,
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where the constant κd ą 0 depends only on d. Using the symmetry of the joint probability
law (3.14) and the last estimate, we infer that
E
ˇˇˇ
X˜it ´ Y it
ˇˇˇ
ď C
ż t
0
ˆ
1
N1{pd`8q
` E
ˇˇˇ
X˜is ´ Y is
ˇˇˇ˙
ds,
which concludes the proof. 
Recall the following definition and characterizations of chaotic measures [35].
Definition 3.9. Let πN be a symmetric joint probability measure on QN and π P PpQq.
We say that πN is π-chaotic if for any k ě 1 and any continuous functions φ1, ..., φk on Q
one has
lim
N
ż kź
l“1
φl dπ
N “
kź
l“1
ż
φl dπ.
Lemma 3.10. Let XN be a sequence of random variables on Q
N whose the joint probability law
πN is symmetric, and π P PpQq. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) πN is π-chaotic;
(ii) the empirical measure νˆN
XN
converges in law toward the deterministic measure π;
(iii) for any continuous function φ on Q, it holds that
lim
N
E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φd
`
νˆNXN ´ π
˘ˇˇˇˇ “ 0.
Combining Lemma 3.10 and Proposition 3.8, we deduce the propagation of chaos for
system (3.13).
Proposition 3.11. For any t P r0, T s, ifmN ptq is the joint probability law of X˜t :“ pX˜jt q1ďjďN ,
thenmN ptq ismptq-chaotic.
Proof. Let φ be a Lipschitz continuous function on Q. From Proposition 3.8, we have that
E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φdpµˆN
X˜t
´ µˆNYtq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ď }φ}LipN
Nÿ
k“1
E
ˇˇˇ
X˜it ´ Y it
ˇˇˇ
ď }φ}LipCT
N1{pd`8q
.
Invoking the fact that LpYtq “ bNi“1mptq and Lemma 3.10, it holds that
lim
N
E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φdpmptq ´ µˆNYtq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ “ 0.
The claimed result follows from
E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φdpµˆN
X˜t
´mptqq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ď E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φdpµˆN
X˜t
´ µˆNYtq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ` E
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
φdpmptq ´ µˆNYtq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ .

We are now in position to prove Theorem 3.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Observe that for any two random variables X, Y, one has
d1 pLpXq,LpYqq ď E |X´ Y| .
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Hence, combining Lemma 3.8 and estimate (3.15) one gets that
lim
N
max
1ďiďN
d1
`
L
`
Xit
˘
,mptq˘ “ 0.
On the other hand, we have
lim
N
ˇˇˇ
λrmptqs ´ Eλ
”
νˆN
X˜t
ıˇˇˇ
“ 0 and lim
N
›››urmptqs ´ Eu ”νˆN
X˜t
ı›››
8
“ 0,
thanks to Proposition 3.11 and Lemma 3.10. In fact, pointwise convergence is a conse-
quence of assertion (ii) in Lemma 3.10, and the convergence is actually uniform since
u rPpQqs is compact in CpQq. We conclude the proof for pλ, u,mq by invoking (3.15) and
the continuous dependence estimates (2.12a)-(2.12b). The results for pv, µq follows using
similar steps as for pλ, u,mq. 
Remark 3.12. Note that the two main arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.7 are the con-
tinuous dependence estimate, and symmetry with respect to states of the other players.
4. EXPONENTIAL CONVERGENCE TO THE ERGODIC MFG EQUILIBRIUM
We prove in this section the exponential convergence of the quasi-stationnary sys-
tem (1.6) to the ergodic equilibrium assuming that σ1 “ σ and Hpx, pq “ |p|2{2. The
proofs rely on algebraic properties of the equations, the continuous dependence esti-
mates (Lemma 2.11), and the monotonicity condition (1.2). Throughout this section we
suppose that assumptions (H1),(H5), and (H6) are fulfilled. In addition, we assume that
the coupling F satisfies the monotonicity condition:
(1.2) @m,m1 P PpQq,
ż
Q
`
F px,mq ´ F px,m1q˘ dpm´m1qpxq ě 0.
For the sake of simplicity we set σ “ σ1 “ 1.
In this framework the quasi-stationary MFG system (1.6) takes the following form,
(4.1)
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
λptq ´∆u` 1
2
|Du|2 “ F px,mptqq in p0,8q ˆQ,
Btm´∆m´ divpmDuq “ 0 in p0,8q ˆQ,
mp0q “ m0 in Q, ă u ą“ 0 in p0,8q.
System (4.1) has a unique global (in time) classical solution thanks to Theorem 2.8. Con-
sider the following ergodic Mean Field Games problem:
(4.2)
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
λ¯´∆u¯` 1
2
|Du¯|2 “ F px, m¯q in Q,
´∆m¯´ divpm¯Du¯q “ 0 in Q,
m¯ ě 0 in Q, ă m¯ ą“ 1, ă u¯ ą“ 0.
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Under the monotonicity condition (1.2), uniqueness holds for system (4.2). In all this
section pλ¯, u¯, m¯q denotes the unique solution to (4.2). Observe that m¯ ” e´u¯{ 〈e´u¯〉 , so
that the following holds
(4.3) 1{κ¯ ď m¯ ď κ¯
for some constant κ¯ ą 0.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1. There exists R0 ą 0 such that if
}m0 ´ m¯}2 ď R0,
then the following holds for some constants A, δ ą 0:
|λptq ´ λ¯| ` }uptq ´ u¯}C2 ` }mptq ´ m¯}2 ď Ae´δt for any t ě 0.
This convergence result reveals that our decision-making mechanism lead to the emer-
gence of a Mean Field Games equilibrium, under the conditions mentioned above. This
can also be interpreted as a phase transition from a non-equilibrium state to an equi-
librium state (see also [29, 30]). Agents reach this equilibrium by adjusting and self-
correcting. We believe that this convergence result holds true in more general cases. For
instance, one can show that an analogous convergence result holds for system (1.5) when
the discount rate ρ is small enough (c.f. Remark 4.4).
Let pλ, u,mq be the solution to (4.1), and set
(4.4) ς :“ λ´ λ¯, w :“ u´ u¯, and π :“ m´ m¯.
The triplet pς, w, πq is a solution to the following system of equations:
(4.5)
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
ςptq ´∆w ` xDu¯,Dwy ` 1
2
|Dw|2 “ F px, m¯` πptqq ´ F px, m¯q in p0,8q ˆQ,
Btπ ´∆π ´ divpπDu¯q ´ divpm¯Dwq ´ divpπDwq “ 0 in p0,8q ˆQ,
πp0q “ m0 ´ m¯ in Q, ă w ą“ 0 in p0,8q.
The following preliminary Lemma states the dependence of w and ς on π in the first
equation of (4.5).
Lemma 4.2. Let̟ be a probability measure on Q which is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, and such that
̟ “ m¯` π,
where π P L2pQq. There exists a unique periodic solution pςrπs, wrπsq in R ˆ C2pQq to the
following problem:
(4.6)
$&
% ς ´∆w ` xDu¯,Dwy `
1
2
|Dw|2 “ F px,̟q ´ F px, m¯q in p0,8q ˆQ
ă w ą“ 0 in p0,8q.
Moreover, the following estimates hold
(4.7a) |ςrπs| ď C}π}2,
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(4.7b) }wrπs}C2 ď C 1}π}2.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of regular solutions to such problems are discussed in
Section 2. Estimates (4.7a)-(4.7b) are a direct consequence of the uniqueness and the con-
tinuous dependence estimates (2.12a)-(2.12b). 
Next we give the following technical Lemma.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a constant κ ą 0 such that
}π{m¯}2 ď κ}Dpπ{m¯q}2,
for any π P V 1,2pQq :“ tπ PW 1,2pQq { ă π ą“ 0u.
Proof. As usual, the result is obtained by contradiction. In fact, if our claim is not satisfied
one can find a sequence pπnq P V 1,2pQq such that for any n ě 1,
(4.8) }πn{m¯}2 “ 1 and 1
n
ě }Dpπn{m¯q}2.
By Sobolev embeddings, pπn{m¯qn converges (up to a subsequence) to some π¯ in L2pQq.
Using (4.8) it follows that π¯ is constant, i.e. π¯ ” C . Moreover,
C “
ż
Q
m¯π¯ “ lim
n
ż
Q
πn “ 0;
this provides the desired contradiction owing to (4.8). 
Combining these elements one can prove the main Theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let pς, w, πq be a smooth solution to (4.5). Recall that
Dm¯ “ ´e´u¯Du¯{ ă e´u¯ ą“ ´m¯Du¯,
so that
(4.9) D
´ π
m¯
¯
“ Dπ ` πDu¯
m¯
,
and
(4.10) divpm¯Dwq “ m¯∆w ` xDm¯,Dwy “ ´m¯ p´∆w ` xDu¯,Dwyq .
We infer that
divpm¯Dwq “ ´m¯
ˆ
´ςptq ´ 1
2
|Dw|2 ` F px, m¯` πptqq ´ F px, m¯q
˙
,
which provides in particular
Btπ´∆π´divpπDu¯q`m¯
ˆ
´ςptq ´ 1
2
|Dw|2 ` F px, m¯` πptqq ´ F px, m¯q
˙
´divpπDwq “ 0.
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Hence, using (4.9), (4.7b) and the monotonicity of F , one has
d
dt
ż
Q
π2
2m¯
“
ż
Q
π
m¯
”
∆π ` divpπDu¯q ` divpπDwq
´m¯
ˆ
´ςptq ´ 1
2
|Dw|2 ` F px, m¯` πptqq ´ F px, m¯q
˙ı
“
ż
Q
"
´|Dπ ` πDu¯|
2
m¯
` π|Dw|
2
2
´ πxDπ,Dwy
m¯
´ π
2xDu¯,Dwy
m¯
*
´
ż
Q
π pF px, m¯` πptqq ´ F px, m¯qq
ď
ż
Q
´m¯
ˇˇˇ
ˇD
ˆ
πptq
m¯
˙ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2
` C}πptq}32 ` 1{κ¯}Dπptq}2}πptq}22.
ď ´1{κ¯
ż
Q
ˇˇˇ
ˇD
ˆ
πptq
m¯
˙ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2
` C p}πptq}2 ` }Dπptq}2q }πptq}22.
(4.11)
Using Lemma 4.3, one easily checks that
(4.12) }πptq}2 ` }Dπptq}2 ď C
››››D
ˆ
πptq
m¯
˙››››
2
.
Thus the following holds
(4.13)
d
dt
}πptq2{m¯}1 ď ´1{C0}πptq2{m¯}1 `M}πptq2{m¯}21,
for some C0,M ą 0, thanks to (4.3) and Young’s inequality. For anyR0 ă 1?κ¯MC0 , the last
differential inequality entails that
}πptq2{m¯}1 ď 1{MC0
1`
´
1
MC0}πp0q2{m¯}1 ´ 1
¯
et{C0
for any t ě 0.
Estimates of Lemma 4.2 conclude the proof. 
Remark 4.4. One notices that the previous proof can be adapted to show that (1.5) con-
verges exponentially fast to (1.3) when the discount rate ρ is small enough, under the
same assumptions of Theorem 4.1. In fact, setting π˜ :“ µ ´ µ¯, the same arguments lead-
ing to (4.13) also provide
d
dt
}π˜ptq2{µ¯}1 ď ´1{C˜0}π˜ptq2{µ¯}1 ` M˜}π˜ptq2{µ¯}21 ` Cρ}π˜ptq2{µ¯}1.
Therefore, the same conclusion holds when ρ is small enough.
Remark 4.5. In practice, this convergence results can help to understand the emergence of
highly-rational equilibria in situations with myopic decision-making mechanisms. For
instance in [12, Section 2.2.2] the authors consider a decision-making mechanism for
pedestrian dynamics that is very similar to the mechanism described in Section 3. Theo-
rem 4.1 can apply for this kind of models, in the case of a quadratic running cost, and a
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monotonous coupling function (pedestrians dislike congested areas) which satisfies (H1)
and (H5). For instance F can take the following form:
F px,mq “
ż
Rd
φ ˚mpyqφpx´ yqdy,
where ˚ is the usual convolution product (in Rd), and φ is a smooth, even function with
compact support.
APPENDIX A. ELEMENTARY FACTS ON THE FOKKER-PLANCK EQUATION
Let V : r0, T s ˆ Q Ñ R be a given bounded vector field, which is continuous in time
and Ho¨lder continuous in space, and we consider the following Fokker-Planck equation:
(A.1)
# Btm´ σ∆m´ divpmV q “ 0 in p0, T q ˆQ,
mp0q “ m0 in Q;
and the following stochastic differential equation:
(A.2) dXt “ V pt,Xtqdt`
?
2σ dBt t P p0, T s, X0 “ Z0,
where pBtq is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion over some probability space
pΩ,F ,Pq and Z0 P L1pΩq is random and independent of pBtq. Under these assumptions,
there is a unique solution to (A.2) and the following hold:
Lemma A.1. If m0 “ LpZ0q then, mptq “ LpXtq is a weak solution to (A.1) and there exists a
constant CT ą 0 such that, for any t, s P r0, T s,
d1pmptq,mpsqq ď CT p1` }V }8q|t´ s|1{2.
Proof. The first assertion is a straightforward consequence of Itoˆ’s formula. On the other
hand, for any 1-Lipschitz continuous function φ and any t ě s, one hasż
Td
φpxqdpmptq ´mpsqqpxq ď E|φpXtq ´ φpXsq| ď E|Xt ´ Xs|
ď E
„ż t
s
|V pu,Xuq|du`
?
2σ|Bt ´Bs|

ď }V }8pt´ sq `
a
2σpt´ sq.

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